Book Project

With Andrew W. Delton & Reuben Kline

University of Michigan Press

Climate Games: Experiments on How People Prevent Disaster

Selected Working Projects

We are vulnerable to disasters, yet citizens hesitate to spend on disaster prevention. Is this because the problem is too complex? Or are citizens concerned political elites will behave poorly? Using an experimental economic game that simulates disaster, we tested if people can understand when an institution incentivizes elites to exaggerate the cost of disaster prevention. Citizen players could contribute money to prevent disaster. Leader players knew the cost of prevention and reported it to citizens, with the option to exaggerate. We manipulated whether the institution allowed leaders to personally benefit if citizens contributed too much. Citizens were sensitive to this, trusting the leader less and contributing less when leaders could benefit from exaggeration. Thus, players could discriminate between institutions that did and did not create incentives for inefficiency. This helps clarify why voters might oppose spending on disaster prevention and sheds light on the nature of voter rationality.

The Politics of Pooling Risk: Compassion, Self-Interest, and Healthcare

With Daniella P. Alva & Andrew W. Delton

Revise & Resubmit, Abstract

How inaccurate beliefs undermine support for solutions after disaster

Under Review

Efficacy Under Climate Change: A Systematic Review

With Payel Sen & Temis Taylor

Under Review, Abstract

Graphs Distorted Americans’ Preferences for a Fast COVID-19 Vaccine Rollout

With Markus Prior & Justin Curl

Paying Attention & Paying the Cost: Wildfires in the American West

With Alicia Cooperman, Sara Constantino, & Alexander Gard-Murray

The Winds of Change? Attitudes Toward Wind Projects and Their Electoral Implications in Texas

With Oksan Bayulgen, Lyle Scruggs, Carol Atkinson-Palombo, & Adam Gallaher

Peer-Reviewed Publications

The road to reelection is paved with good intentions: Experiments on the role of outcomes and intentions in voting behavior

Talbot M. Andrews & Scott Bokemper

Journal of Politics, Forthcoming

Who punishes? A note on responses to cooperation and defection across cultures

Talbot M. Andrews

Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2024

People are Less Myopic about Future than Past Collective Outcomes

Markus Prior, Abdelaziz Alsharawy, & Talbot M. Andrews

PNAS, 2024

News from home: How local media shapes climate change attitudes

Talbot M. Andrews, Cana Kim, & Jeong Hyun Kim

Public Opinion Quarterly, 2023

Risk from response to a changing climate

Talbot M. Andrews, Nicholas P. Simpson, Katharine Mach, & Christopher Trisos

Climate Risk Management, 2023

Adaptation to compound climate risks: A systematic global stocktake

Nicholas P. Simpson, Portia Adade Williams, Katharine J.Mach, Lea Berrang-Ford, Robbert Biesbroek, Marjolijn Haasnoot, Alcade C. Segnon, Donovan Campbell, Justice Issah Musah-Surugu, Elphin Tom Joe, Abraham Marshall Nunbogu, Salma Sabour, Andreas L. S. Meyer, Talbot M. Andrews, Chandni Singh, A. R. Siders, Judy Lawrence, Maartenvan Aalst, Christopher H. Trisos, The Global Adaptation Mapping Initiative Team

iScience, 2023

Who do you trust? Institutions that constrain leaders help people prevent disaster

Talbot M. Andrews, Andrew W. Delton, & Reuben Kline

Journal of Politics, 2022

Too many ways to help: How to promote climate change mitigation behaviors

Talbot M. Andrews, Reuben Kline, Yanna Krupnikov, & John Barry Ryan

Journal of Environmental Psychology, 2022

Anticipating moral Hazard undermines climate mitigation in an experimental geoengineering game

Talbot M. Andrews, Andrew W. Delton, & Reuben Kline

Ecological Economics, 2022

Climate Change Literacy in Africa

Nicholas Philip Simpson, Talbot M. Andrews, Matthias Kronke, Christopher Lennard, Romaric C. Odoulami, Birgitt Ouweneel, Anna Steynor, & Christopher H. Trisos

Nature Climate Change, 2021

Preferences for Prevention: People Assume Expensive Problems Have Expensive Solutions

Talbot M. Andrews & John Barry Ryan

Risk Analysis, 2021

Is a Rational Politics of Disaster Possible? Making Useful Decisions for Others in an Experimental Disaster Game

Talbot M. Andrews, Andrew W. Delton, & Reuben Kline

Political Behavior, 2021

From Moral Hazard to Risk-Response Feedback
Joseph Jebari, Olufemi Taiwo, Talbot M. Andrews, Valentina Aquila, Brian Beckage, Mariia Belaia, Maggie Clifford, Jay Fuhrman, David P. Keller, Katharine J. Mach, David R. Morrow, Kaitlin T. Raimi, Daniele Visioni, Simon Nicholson, & Christopher H. Trisos

Climate Risk Management, 2021

Who feels the impacts of climate change?

Talbot M. Andrews & Oleg Smirnov

Global Environmental Change, 2020

Rebel recruitment in civil conflict

Katherine Sawyer & Talbot M. Andrews

International Interactions, 2020

When trust matters: The case of gun control

John Barry Ryan, Talbot M. Andrews, Tracy Goodwin, & Yanna Krupnikov

Political Behavior, 2020

High risk-high reward investments to mitigate climate change

Talbot M. Andrews, Andrew W. Delton, & Reuben Kline